



English Version No 1/2016 (10 March – 7 April 2016)

Contents	Page
POLITICS	1
Taiwan accuses PRC of abduction after Kenya extradites 45 Taiwanese to the mainland	1
'Panama papers': High-ranking Chinese politicians implicated in offshore dealings	2
China summons G-7 diplomats over statement on maritime security	2
Taking a closer look at the 13th five-year plan	3
SOCIETY AND THE MEDIA	5
Tensions in Hong Kong rise as new parties put independence on their agenda	5
Mark Zuckerberg's charm offensive in China provokes scornful reactions	6
Unpaid wages trigger strikes and violent clashes in several provinces	6
THE ECONOMY	8
China's vision of a global electrical power network	8
Signs of a modest recovery on the property market	8
China's steel industry goes online, creating several new e-commerce platforms	9
GOVERNMENT AND THE INTERNET	10
China's cyber army: informatisation to enhance the striking force of the People's Liberation Army	10
THE EUROPEAN DEBATE ON CHINA	11
EU Member States struggle for a common stance on human rights in China	11
Xi Jinping's state visit in Prague – will China become the anchor of hope for Eurosceptics?	12
THE LATEST FROM MERICS	12

POLITICS

Taiwan accuses PRC of abduction after Kenya extradites 45 Taiwanese to the mainland

In an unprecedented move, Beijing has succeeded in having 45 Taiwanese citizens extradited from Kenya. 22 of the group are suspected of involvement in a telecommunications fraud, while 23 were already tried and acquitted in Kenya. Kenyan police used tear gas to force the Taiwanese onto the plane. When confronted by the Taiwanese government, which called the move "abduction", mainland authorities responded by accusing Taiwan of disregarding the "One China Principle" under which the PRC claims Taiwan as one of its provinces.

The move can be seen as part of China's overall increase in assertiveness on the global stage as the PRC has previously engaged in what many observers consider to be cross-border kidnappings of Hong Kong nationals, including some with dual EU citizenship. While the extradition could be interpreted as a

way for China to put pressure on president-elect Tsai Ing-wen, it also sets a dangerous precedent for Taiwanese living or working abroad as well as for other people of Chinese origin whom the PRC may claim as its citizens.

EN: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-36023738>

CN: <http://newtalk.tw/news/view/2016-04-12/72041>

‘Panama papers’: High-ranking Chinese politicians implicated in offshore dealings

Relatives of at least eight current or former members of the Politburo Standing Committee, including head of state Xi Jinping, are said to have set up offshore companies. Offshore law firm Mossack Fonseca has operated in China for the last 13 years and runs as many as eight offices around the country. As the German newspaper *Süddeutsche Zeitung* reported last week, eight ‘princelings’, as the children of top officials in the Chinese Communist Party are called, have explicitly moved money to offshore accounts in recent few years.

More specifically, the ‘Panama papers’ say that various other people in China have offshore interests besides Xi Jinping’s brother-in-law, who first hit the headlines back in 2012. Among them are the daughter of former prime minister Li Peng, and Bo Xilai, the former leader of the Party in Chongqing, who was sentenced to lifelong imprisonment in 2013, just like his wife, Gu Kailai. She is accused of murdering the British businessman Neil Heywood, who is said to have been well informed about their letterbox companies in offshore havens.

Sebastian Heilmann, Director of MERICS, deems it highly unlikely that Xi Jinping will allow anyone to investigate his own family’s affairs, even though he is the one who started the country’s anti-corruption campaign. Currently, however, many prominent families in China are actually selling off their foreign investments – apparently in a bid to eradicate any traces of business done in the past. The children of top-ranking veterans of the Chinese Revolution would only be targeted in exceptional cases, Heilmann reckons. This might jeopardise the credibility of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign, he says.

In China, reports on the Panama papers have been suppressed for a number of days now.

EN: <http://www.theguardian.com/news/2016/apr/06/panama-papers-reveal-offshore-secrets-china-red-nobility-big-business>

China summons G-7 diplomats over statement on maritime security

China sharply criticized the G-7 Foreign Ministers’ Statement on Maritime Security, which was published after the groups’ meeting in Hiroshima (Japan) on April 11. In the statement, the foreign ministers of the United States, Canada, Italy, Germany, France, the UK and Japan expressed their “concern” over the increasing tensions in the East and South China Sea. While refraining from addressing China directly, the ministers stated their opposition to “any intimidation coercive or provocative unilateral actions”, e.g. “building of outposts as well as their use for military purposes”. Furthermore, they called for “peaceful settlements of maritime disputes” in the region.

The Chinese side condemned the joint statement as counterproductive to resolving the territorial disputes in the region: Spokesperson Lu Kang defended China's construction activities in the South China Sea. He further accused the G-7 members of "hyping up maritime issues and fueling tensions in the region". Going one step further, on April 12, China summoned the Japanese ambassador and other G-7 envoys over the Statement on Maritime Security.

With the decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration on the West Philippine Sea dispute expected in June, tensions in the South China Sea are likely to increase even further in the weeks to come.

EN: http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2016/04/11/world/asia/11reuters-g7-china.html?_r=0

CN: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/t1354750.shtml

Taking a closer look at the 13th five-year plan

Overly ambitious goals jeopardise the reform agenda

The 13th five-year plan adopted by the National People's Congress on 16 March is primarily intended to turn China into a 'moderately prosperous society', as the Communist party puts it, by the year 2020. To achieve this, the economy will need to grow by an average of at least 6.5 per cent per annum over the next five years. In addition to this, the program foresees the average per-capita income in China doubling by 2020 compared to 2010 and almost 56 million people being freed from the burden of poverty by the same time. The goal to reduce poverty is binding, whereas the targets with respect to growth in GDP and income are merely to be aimed for, as the government regards them as depend on market developments over the next few years.

In view of the economic downturn the country is currently experiencing, all these objectives seem extremely ambitious. Although doubling people's income is a realistic aim in rural areas, achieving this goal in towns and cities is likely to be very difficult, not least because of the rising urban unemployment to be expected. The economic growth being targeted by the Chinese government will also prove hard to attain. Consequently, there is a strong risk of the government departing from its original plans for reforms and continuing to invest millions of CNY in new infrastructure projects in order to achieve their growth goals.

Promise of an improvement in quality and service in the public sector

Goal	How binding?
achieve an average annual increase in GDP of at least 6.5%	non-binding
achieve an average annual increase in work productivity of 6.6%	non-binding
increase the rate of urbanisation to 60%	non-binding
increase the service sector's share of GDP to 56%	non-binding
increase the amount of spending on R&D to 2.5% of GDP	non-binding
provide landline broadband access to 70% of all households	non-binding
increase the amount of disposable per-capita income by an average of at least 6.5% / year	non-binding
create at least 50m new jobs	non-binding
lift 55.75m people out of poverty	binding
raise the amount of basic state-pension cover to 90%	non-binding
reduce the country's carbon footprint by 18%	binding
achieve good air quality in urban areas for at least 80% of the year	binding

©merics

A higher level of education, better health care and expansion of the social security system are intended to make China a stronger nation and bring it closer to being a modestly prosperous society (小康社会). Two chapters in the 13th five-year plan are devoted to increasing the state's involvement in public services.

In the 12th five-year plan, the Chinese leadership emphasised the need to provide more social services in urban and rural areas. By 2020, the current government is counting on merging the two separate systems for the urban and rural population and on improving the quality and level of social security that citizens are provided with. All parts of the population are meant to benefit from these developments. At the same time, however, the Chinese leadership is trying to overcome the divide between urban and rural areas. The central government and the provincial governments are expected to play a bigger role in funding and providing public services in the future with the goal to reduce regional inequality. Up to now, the kind and quality of public services primarily depended on the financial strength of individual towns, districts and cities. Besides this, the government also wants more emphasis to be put on using e-government applications. One of its specific objectives is for ninety per cent of the population to have an electronic social-security card by 2020.

Innovation and digitisation are high on the agenda

Technological innovation and digitisation are going to be given top priority in Chinese politics over the next five years: the 13th five-year plan has sent out a strong signal again in this respect, devoting a whole chapter to both matters. The subject of innovation is addressed in the second out of a total of nineteen chapters.

Six high-tech sectors described as being ‘strategic industries of the future’ are intended to play a particularly important role here, as the plan foresees them accounting for 15 per cent of China’s economic growth by 2020. Among other fields, this refers to the IT industry, energy-storage systems, decentralised sources of power and alternative fuel vehicles, such as electric cars. According to the five-year plan, firms working in these sectors should increase their efforts to tap into the innovative capacities in other countries. One way of doing this is by increasing the number of research centres around the world. The presence of Chinese businesses in these sectors in Europe is therefore likely to grow even further in the coming years.

Even if China’s high-tech industries do manage to increase their innovative power, however, it remains to be seen whether this would actually be enough for such ambitious political goals to be achieved. After all, in the last five-year plan, R&D was the one field in which China was unable to achieve the target it had set itself: overall, the spending on R&D amounted to a ‘mere’ 2.1 per cent of GDP between 2011 and 2015 rather than 2.2 per cent, which had been targeted.

The state’s ‘international responsibility and obligations’ become a new focus

The 13th five-year plan dedicates just five of a total of 80 chapters to foreign policy. Foreign policy issues are also addressed in other chapters, like those on the regional linking of China’s border regions or the development of its maritime economy. The document touches on a wide range of topics concerned with foreign trade and security policy, but without setting any measurable goals for them. The new chapter on international responsibility and obligations, the special emphasis put on the ‘Belt and Road’ initiative (一帶一路) and reduced focus on regional co-operation are all noticeable changes. The PRC intends to take on its international responsibility by providing more foreign aid as well as free economic policy training for civil servants from countries with emerging economies. In this new chapter on international responsibility, the plan also addresses security issues, particularly anti-terrorism measures and the safety of international sea routes. Besides, the Chinese leadership identified health, civil protection, environmental protection and anti-poverty measures as issues that it wants to tackle through its international commitments. As in the 12th five-year plan, the chapters on foreign policy are in the last part of the document.

SOCIETY AND THE MEDIA

Tensions in Hong Kong rise as new parties put independence on their agenda

Hong Kong citizens are pushing back against the mainland amidst growing concerns over eroding freedoms and the territory’s future. On April 10, members of the now disbanded group *Scholarism* around student leader Joshua Wong founded the new party *Demosisto*. One of *Demosisto*’s goals is to push for a referendum by 2026 in which residents of Hong Kong will be allowed to vote on their political future after 2047, when the “One Country Two Systems” principle that protects Hong Kong’s unique political, economic, and legal system officially expires.

Demosisto is not alone in its quest for Hong Kong self-determination; in fact, many observers count it among the more moderate voices: On March 28, a group of former Occupy Central activists founded the *Hong Kong National Party*, which has explicitly made Hong Kong independence its goal. In response, Hong Kong's government refused to register the Party, arguing that advocating for independence is illegal under Hong Kong's Basic Law. Mainland media have also lashed out at the new party, calling its goal of Hong Kong independence "unparalleled madness."

EN: <http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/1935019/hong-kong-independence-not-feasible-now-says-new-pro>

CN: <http://opinion.huanqiu.com/editorial/2016-03/8791550.html>

Mark Zuckerberg's charm offensive in China provokes scornful reactions

The prospect of 600 million new Facebook users in China is a dream for Mark Zuckerberg. The founder of Facebook met with **Liu Yunshan**, director of the CCP Propaganda Department, and Alibaba's CEO **Jack Ma** in Beijing in March. Critical observers quickly presumed that above all else he was lobbying to have Facebook unblocked. The platform has been blocked in China ever since 2009. Twitter joined in, sporting the hashtag #ZuckingUp, a pun on 'sucking up'. On Weibo, a Chinese platform similar to Twitter, users also ridiculed 'Comrade Zuckerberg' – so much so that official censors admonished the media and online platforms to '**control malicious comments about Zuckerberg**'.

A photograph showing Zuckerberg jogging at Tiananmen Square triggered **especially intense derision**; how Zuckerberg could jog at all through smog-ridden Beijing was the question asked by many Chinese users. Others circulated a photomontage on which Zuckerberg is seen jogging in front of a tank – an allusion to the suppression of the Tiananmen protests of 1989.

The criticism of Zuckerberg's visit to China is justified: only a short while ago, PRC President and CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping called for **unconditional obedience** to the Chinese Communist Party by all news media operating in China. In order to be accessible to Chinese internet users, Facebook would have to introduce a strict regimen of censorship that reacts quickly and without exception to instructions from the Party.

EN <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/21/business/seeking-access-to-facebook-in-china-zuckerberg-courts-risks.html>

CN <http://china.huanqiu.com/article/2016-03/8743991.html>

Unpaid wages trigger strikes and violent clashes in several provinces

Protests by workers of the state-run Longmay Mining Group in Heilongjiang province ended in violent clashes between miners and police. Since 9 March, a total of around 5,000 workers from the coal and steel industries had been protesting about the non-payment of their wages in **Shaanxi**, **Guangdong**, **Jilin** and **Heilongjiang**. The provincial governments deployed the police to confront the demonstrators forcefully. The official Chinese media only reported on 'incidents', emphasising the 'constructive search' for solutions that was said to be going on. Video clips of the actual protests made the rounds in China's social media, however – and were quickly censored.

The reason for the increasingly violent strikes and protests in the coal and steel industries is that excess production capacity has been reduced, resulting in layoffs. The number of labour protests rose sharply in 2015. As the Hong Kong employment-rights organisation [China Labour Bulletin](#) reports, there were over 2,700 protests in China in 2015 – more than twice the number that occurred the preceding year. The protests slackened off temporarily during the holidays relating to the Chinese New Year’s celebration in mid-February.

As illustrated by the graph for Henan, Guangdong and Jiangsu, the provinces with the heaviest concentration of protests, most of the publicised incidents primarily involved protests by workers who had lost their jobs with private companies in the construction and manufacturing sectors. Protests are expected to increase again as the year advances.

CN: <http://www.bannedbook.org/bnews/cbnews/djynews/20160321/514828.html>

EN: http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/15/world/asia/china-labor-strike-protest.html?_r=0



THE ECONOMY

China's vision of a global electrical power network

China is aiming to have a global 'energy internet' (全球能源互联网) in place that interconnects various power systems around the world by the year 2050. The initiative originates primarily from the state-run power-network operator State Grid and its chairman, Liu Zhenya. **Support also comes from prominent figures in the Chinese leadership.**


An **international organisation under Chinese control** was founded in Beijing on 30 March to move ahead with the project. The participants include renowned firms such as **Huawei, ABB, Accenture and Siemens** in addition to State Grid. According to the organisation, in the years ahead, China is going to invest **two trillion CNY** per annum (approx. 270 billion EUR) in grid expansion and the energy industry in general, and will internationalise the involvement of Chinese businesses in these areas step by step.

In spite of reasonable doubts concerning the technical and political feasibility of the project, China's commitment to creating a global energy network is based on a long-term strategy that must be taken seriously. In fact, it is likely to have far-reaching consequences for Germany and the rest of Europe. Not only will Chinese power and energy companies greatly increase their presence on international markets in the future (particularly State Grid), but Beijing will also use a global 'energy internet' to prepare the country for periods of slower economic growth. Chinese power-network operators should then be in a position to sell low-cost surplus energy to buyers as far away as Europe thanks to powerful high-voltage transmission lines.

EN: <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/68cdef50-f66a-11e5-803c-d27c7117d132.html#axzz44T49Tsub>

CN: <http://www.chinahightech.com/html/chany/xny/2016/0330/315681.html>

Signs of a modest recovery on the property market



The latest figures from the National Bureau of Statistics show the property sector has made a modest recovery recently: prices for housing have increased steadily since last summer in 47 of the 70 cities surveyed. The Chinese Government sees this as proof that its stabilisation policy has been a success. After all, the mandatory amount of **equity that prospective property buyers are required to provide has been reduced from 30 to 20 per cent** and stamp duty (i.e. land tax) due for a second house has been cut by two thirds to stimulate demand for property.

It is a stated goal of economic policy to invigorate the property sector, with the construction industry being a vital engine driving the Chinese economy. However, the latest price increase is only linked to government policy to a degree; in addition to that, turbulence on the stock market has been undermining investors' confidence in stocks and shares since the summer of 2015. This turn has made property more attractive as a result.

The megalopolises of Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen have experienced an explosive development of property prices, leading to the threat of a bubble forming. Thus, the Chinese Government is facing a challenge: on the one hand, it wishes to support the property markets in less well-developed cities, while on the other, demand always far exceeds supply in the economic centres, thus driving prices upwards. In the wake of the stock market turbulence, the Government's top priority here should be to prevent too sharp an increase in prices from occurring.

CN: http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/zxfb/201603/t20160318_1332610.html
EN: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-03/18/c_135201699.htm



Source: ImagineChina

China's steel industry goes online, creating several new e-commerce platforms

Necessity is the mother of invention. Whilst the steel industry is being plagued by excess capacity and many companies are making losses, the steel manufacturer Baogang (宝钢) is relying on new IT solutions to help it through the slump. Last week, its subsidiary Ouyeel (欧冶) set up an e-commerce platform for the international steel trade; the company wants to facilitate the export of Chinese steel products this

way. In addition, Baogang would like to use their online activities to develop sources of income by offering new services. To date, there is no charge for transactions made via the company's platform. Its initial goal is to handle ten per cent of Chinese steel exports through the platform.

The digitisation of the steel trade in China is already moving at high speed. Ouyeel and around 200 other companies have now launched platforms for the steel trade within China. Development of trade platforms designed for specific industries depends on the government's strategy of digitising the industry more heavily and promoting services specifically related to the sector. Similar trends can currently be observed in the aeronautics industry and in automotive manufacturing.

CN: <http://stock.sohu.com/20160331/n442922685.shtml>

CN: <http://business.sohu.com/20160405/n443300555.shtml>

GOVERNMENT AND THE INTERNET

China's cyber army: informatisation to enhance the striking force of the People's Liberation Army

by Nabil Alsabah

The word 'informatisation' (信息化) has been an obligatory part of the vocabulary of every party functionary ever since Xi Jinping took office. The digital world is so crucial in Xi's eyes that he founded a central leading group for cybersecurity and informatisation in December 2013. This high-ranking committee is responsible for drafting a comprehensive strategy for the digital sector. Leading members of the armed forces also belong to the body.

Informatisation plays an important role in the modernisation of the People's Liberation Army. As part of the military reforms, Xi intends to recode the DNA of the PLA by 2020, and the new code is to be digital from the start. Xi founded the Commission for Science and Technology (军委科技委) in January 2016, for instance. It is directly incorporated into the highest military decision-making body, the Central Military Commission. [Reports indicate](#) that the commission is patterned on the American Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). The commission is responsible for promoting fundamental military research in all areas, from artificial intelligence to genetic engineering.

In order to take full advantage of the military potential of digital technologies, Xi even created an independent military branch in January: Strategic Support Forces (SSF, 战略支援部队). The SSF have an ambitious task: to develop and enhance China's defensive and offensive cyberweapons. In addition, the SSF are to develop a broad range of communications technologies for intelligence purposes, particularly the internet and satellites. Their responsibilities also include adapting the apparatus of psychological warfare to the digital age; in times of actual war, for example, public opinion in the enemy civilian population is to be manipulated through social media. Moreover, the SSF are to implement the informatisation of the entire armed forces, including communications channels and chains of command. Being a military branch for the informatisation of the armed forces, the SSF are on the same hierarchical level as the army, the air force and the navy.

If the informatisation of the People's Liberation Army succeeds, the PLA will move up a league to join the ranks of other modern armed forces.

CN: http://www.cssn.cn/jsx/jsjj_jsx/201601/t20160114_2826914.shtml

EN: <http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2016/01/heres-whats-known-about-chinas-shadowy-new-combat-force/125261/>

THE EUROPEAN DEBATE ON CHINA

EU Member States struggle for a common stance on human rights in China

So far, European leaders have not managed to reach a common position on human-rights violations in China despite the Chinese Government taking an increasingly tough approach against critical voices in its own country.

On 1 March, it transpired that the German ambassador in Beijing had sent a letter to the Chinese leadership, not for instance with his EU colleagues, but together with the diplomatic representatives of the USA, Japan and Canada. In this letter, the four diplomats expressed their **concern about the state's renewed restriction of freedom of expression by adopting new cybersecurity and anti-terrorism laws**. A subsequent letter from the EU ambassador in China shortly afterwards which expressed similar apprehensions could not hide that fact that **the 28 EU Member States had not been able to agree on a common position regarding the laws**.

European disagreements on dealing with human-rights issues in China were also openly apparent a short time later in the UN Human Rights Council. In a **statement dated 10 March**, U.S. Ambassador Keith Harper denounced with unusual clarity the disappearance and forced repatriation of Chinese and foreign nationals to mainland China, forced TV confessions as well as violations of Hong Kong's autonomy rights.

In addition to Germany, the UK and the Netherlands endorsed the U.S. position along with Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Ireland – actually four EU Member States, which are currently not represented on the UN Human Rights Council at all. Nevertheless, there could be no talk of a joint European position here, as Belgium, France, Latvia, Portugal and Slovenia – the majority of EU Member States represented on the Human Rights Council – did not wish to sign the statement.

The difficulty of achieving a coherent European human-rights policy with respect to China is also compounded by individual Member States pursuing their own economic interests. The new cybersecurity and anti-terrorism laws also pose a concrete threat to European companies that have invested in China, however. **The protection of sensitive company data from access by the Chinese Government could be severely hampered in future if the new laws are applied, for example.**

EN: <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-lawmaking-idUSKCN0W225P>

EN: <http://www.voanews.com/content/unprecedented-unhcr-joint-statement-condemns-china-problematic-problems/3229680.html>

Xi Jinping's state visit in Prague – will China become the anchor of hope for Eurosceptics?

Just a few years ago, the Czech Republic was one of the harshest critics of the human-rights situation in China. But during **Xi Jinping's historic state visit to Prague** end of March, only a few isolated protests by **opposition** and **human-rights groups** were to be seen.

The first visit to the Czech Republic by a Chinese head of state was celebrated by all conceivable means – a 21-gun salute, the **award of the key to the city of Prague**, as well as a **reception in the private residence of Czech President Miloš Zeman**. In return, Xi signed an agreement concerning a strategic partnership with Prague and also proclaimed a '**new era of Chinese–Czech relations**', including **Chinese investment amounting to billions of Euro**.

The change of course in the Czech Republic's China policy seen since 2013 under President Zeman, a critic of the EU, bows to a trend that is noticeable across Europe: after years of economic crisis, more and more EU Member States are now backing privileged bilateral relations with Beijing to support their own domestic economy.

By extolling his country as 'China's gateway to Europe' and as the foremost representative of Chinese interests in the EU, Zeman is, however, also joining a political narrative increasingly popular amongst eurosceptic governments. This narrative portrays the intensification of relations with China on the one hand and close involvement with the EU on the other as an 'either/or' decision – you can do one thing, but not the other. **Hungary's Prime Minister Orbán and Poland's President Duda** have also reasoned in a similar way recently.

The Czech president emphasised this point quite clearly by declaring on Chinese television that the poor relations his country had with China in the past were due to the '**submissive attitude of the previous government towards the USA and the EU**'. He then went on to celebrate the signing of the strategic partnership with China as 'an act of national independence'. Zeman's words clearly show how much China has already become the anchor of hope for eurosceptic politicians.

EN: <http://www.radio.cz/en/section/curaffrs/second-day-of-chinese-presidents-visit-sees-signing-of-strategic-partnership-but-also-protests>

CN: <http://m.dwnews.com/china/news/2016-03-29/59728658.html>

THE LATEST FROM MERICS

Job vacancies

- MERICS is looking for a **full-time intern** contributing to the research programs International Relations as well as Economy and Technology

Latest blog posts

- **Buyer beware: China's risky commodity investments** by MERICS Senior Policy Fellow Rolf J. Langhammer (11 April 2016)

- [Panama Papers show that it's all in the family for Xi Jinping](#) by MERICS President Sebastian Heilmann (5 April 2016)
- [How Europe can help prevent an escalation in the South China Sea](#) by MERICS Researcher Thomas Eder (4 April 2016)

MERICS in the media:

- [“Cracks in Xi Jinping’s fortress?”](#), Comment by Kristin Shi-Kupfer in China File (21 March 2016)

Forthcoming events in Berlin:

- Thursday, 14 April 2016: **Panel Discussion** with Angela Köckritz, Jörg Binding and Zhu Yi. [Register now](#)
- Tuesday, 19 April 2016: **MERICS China Lounge** with Entrepreneur Ekkehard Rathgeber (in German), [Register now](#)
- Thursday, 28 April 2016: **Panel Discussion** “The struggle for self-determination in China” (in German) [Register now](#)

© Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS)

This newsletter is based solely on freely available media reports. It does not necessarily endorse the opinions expressed in these reports and cannot guarantee that their sources and materials are (legally) valid. Any use of link citations assumes that these links were created in accordance with existing laws and regulations.