From 5G to NearLink: Europe’s next digital dependency risk

China’s self-reliance drive could soon create another “Huawei moment” for Europe, says Jeroen Groenewegen-Lau. Brussels has the tools to avoid repeating, but it must act quickly.

Less than a decade after Europe had to confront the risks of relying on Huawei, ZTE and other Chinese telecom equipment makers for its 5G networks, it is drifting into a new dependence that is more diffuse and harder to detect. NearLink (星闪, also known as SparkLink), China’s alternative to Bluetooth and WiFi, is entering Europe through imported smartphones, wearable devices like fitness trackers, digital keys and industrial control modules – creating potential lock in effects that could make European companies and consumers increasingly reliant on this technology long before regulators respond.

Europe’s indecision over whether to use or ban Chinese digital tech is now creating issues beyond critical infrastructure. As the region continues to debate the risks and opportunities for 5G, Beijing is positioning NearLink as a new generation of short range communications that combines the low power advantages of Bluetooth with the high throughput capabilities of Wi-Fi to support thousands of connected devices. Peer-reviewed studies back the case for adoption where performance matters. Beyond existing devices, Chinese state linked initiatives are pushing NearLink into areas like robotics and aerospace, while official standard-setting efforts are eyeing areas like anti quantum cryptography and civil drone identification.

NearLink is not just another ordinary wireless protocol

Europe should not treat NearLink as just another ordinary wireless protocol. Unlike Huawei’s role in 5G, which placed Chinese technology at key nodes of communications networks, NearLink is entering Europe through the more distributed layer of connected products and components. 

The strategic significance of this trend cannot be underestimated: As the number of devices using Nearlink increases, the technology will handle ever more security critical data flows. It is another element in China’s drive for technological self-reliance – one that requires an equally comprehensive European response. 

That drive is rooted in the growing technology rivalry between China and the US – NearLink is a product of the so-called tech decoupling between the two nations. Huawei began developing the technology after it was expelled from the Wi Fi Alliance and Bluetooth Special Interest Group in 2019 after it came under US sanctions and framed its efforts as vital to China's digital sovereignty. The same logic has driven China’s development of home-grown mobile network standards, the ill fated WAPI alternative to Wi Fi, the BeiDou satellite navigation system as a counterpart to GPS, and proposals such as NewIP for future internet protocols. 

Huawei is seeking recognition for the technology as a global standard

NearLink’s rollout is currently focused on China, but Huawei is building a supporting network aimed at broad international adoption. The company set up the International SparkLink Wireless Short Range Communication Alliance (iSLA) in 2020 and first deployed Nearlink commercially in its Mate 60 series phone in August 2023. It included the technology in its HarmonyOS 5 operating system in November 2024, which encouraged the software developer community to engage. And in 2025, iSLA reported that over a 100 million NearLink devices had been shipped, backed by over 1,200 alliance members, 600 products, and 300 plus chip and module development boards that help companies create more products. 

Having registered internationally in 2023, iSLA established a Japanese offshoot in August 2025 and the NearLink Europe Partner Program in March 2026, both targeting the automotive sector. In parallel, Huawei is seeking recognition for the technology as a global standard, for instance through the UN-affiliated International Telecommunications Union (ITU). Unlike more confrontational campaigns for WAPI or NewIP, NearLink is being promoted as a technology that can co exist with Bluetooth and Wi Fi. By supporting interoperability and opening parts of the technology stack to developers, Huawei is also lowering entry barriers and diluting the perception that NearLink is purely a proprietary corporate technology. 

The EU has tools needed to manage risks associated with NearLink

The EU has most of the tools needed to manage the risks associated with NearLink – it only needs to use them. The Digital Networks Act and the Cyber Resilience Act promote supply-chain transparency by requiring software bills of materials and lifecycle cybersecurity plans. To close remaining supply-chain governance gaps, the European Commission should uphold its proposed amendment to the Cybersecurity Act, despite opposition from China, parts of industry and legal challenges. This would allow Brussels to classify embedded short range connectivity as part of the security chain in critical sectors, designate NearLink capable modules as sensitive components, and require the disclosure of embedded stacks. 

Combined with a coordinated EU position in global standard setting forums, this would bring NearLink under a governance model that resembles China’s own cybersecurity reviews: not an outright ban on foreign technology, but a structured mechanism to identify, assess and, where necessary, constrain its role in Europe’s critical systems. Such an approach would allow Europe to manage risks, while preserving access to useful innovations and avoiding unnecessary economic costs. 

Europe cannot hesitate until NearLink presents it with another "Huawei moment" – it needs to address the risk of a new strategic dependency now.

This article was first published by The Wire China on August 9, 2026.