The loud Lithuanian exit was caused by several value-related scandals and China's assertive communication, but the deeper disappointment over 17+1 is shared across the region. Therefore, it would be in the Latvian and Estonian interest to jointly distance themselves from the grouping, albeit perhaps picking a less abrasive approach than that of Lithuania, e.g., by leaving, but with statements to communicate and soften the move.
In the Baltic case, the leading motivation to join 16+1 was economic diversification. From the offset, the three Baltic states avoided political buy-ins or dependencies in the form of infrastructure loans. But the cooperation failed to meet the initial economic expectations of exports, FDI and transit increase. On top of that, the few successful projects, e.g., China's Didi Chuxing investment in the Estonian ride-sharing company Taxify in 2017, were concluded bilaterally, and branded as a 17+1 outcome post-hoc. Also, the deteriorating China-US relationship and the increasing recognition of security challenges posed by China in the West is forcing the Baltics to pick a side, and the allies are an obvious choice.
Whether this reasoning stands for all the diverse members of the 17/16+1 format, however, is hard to say, as CEE is not a uniform grouping, neither is it a region – in contrast to China’s perception.