1 | Keohane, Robert O. (1986). Reciprocity in international relations. International Organization, 40(1), 1-27.
2 | TRIPS, The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights; and GATS, the General Agreement on Trade in Services.
3 | For example the North American Free Trade Agreement or the Vietnam-EU Free Trade Agreement to be signed in 2018.
4 | See ECJ Case C-101/05, Skatteverket v A, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-101/05.
5 | See the OECD Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements, http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/Code-Capital-Movements-EN.pdf.
6 | The focus on formal restrictions distorts this perspective. If we were to take into account informal FDI discrimination, China would likely score better in a comparison with its emerging market peers. See section 2.2.
7 | Relaxations included lifting of ownership percentage in steel, ethylene, oil refining, paper manufacturing; opening-up of non-ferrous metal smelting, small construction machinery manufacturing, and ordinary bearings manufacturing; and opening-up of import and export commodity inspection and certification, railway freight transport, insurance brokerage, accounting companies and trust companies.
8 | This includes measures such as a targeted enforcement of laws, financial support and other favorable treatment for local companies, and limited access to government procurement on all levels of the Chinese administrative system. See http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/august/tradoc_152739.08.10.pdf.
9 | http://www.europeanchamber.com.cn/en/publications-archive.
10 | http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/b/c/201707/20170702617581.shtml.
11 | The 12 sectors are: special-use vehicles and new energy automobile manufacturing, ship design, regional and general aircraft repair and maintenance, international maritime transport, rail passenger transport, gas stations, internet access service businesses (i.e. internet cafes), call centers, performance brokers, banking, securities, and insurance.
12 | http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2017-11/17/content_5240376.htm.
13 | http://wzs.mofcom.gov.cn/article/n/201712/20171202691805.shtml.
14 | http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2017-12/22/content_5249525.htm, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2018-01/09/content_5254764.htm
15 | http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2017-07/17/c_1121333722.htm
16 | http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ae/ai/201708/20170802627851.shtml; http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2017-01/17/content_5160624.htm.
17 | https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2tDoVv0GPOE.
18 | http://chinadashboard.asiasociety.org/china-dashboard/.
19 | This classification is based on the authors’ personal judgment, considering legal documents, empirical data (precedents of foreign M&A in those sectors) and conversations with M&A professionals in China.
20 | Center for Economic Business Research (2018). World Economic League Tables.
21 | Chilton, Adam, Milner, Helen, & Tingley, Dustin (2017). Reciprocity and Public Opposition to Foreign Direct Investment. British Journal of Political Science, online first: 1-25.
22 | https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Reports/China 2017 WTO Report.pdf.
23 | Wübbeke, Jost, et al. (2016). Made in China 2025: The making of a high-tech superpower and consequences for industrial countries. MERICS Papers on China No. 2, https://www.merics.org/de/papers-on-china/made-china-2025.
24 | https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/27/business/wilbur-ross-china-trade.html?mcubz=0.
25 | https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2017/august/ustr-announces-initiation-section.
26 | https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2017/20170913-eu-vorschlag-zu-investitionspruefungen-wichtiger-schritt-fuer-faire-wettbewerbsbedingungen-in-europa-und-besseren-schutz-bei-firmenuebernahmen.html.
27 | See our long-standing views and recommendations, for example in: https://www.merics.org/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/COFDI_Chinese_Foreign_Direct_Investment_EN.pdf
28 | http://www.internationallawoffice.com/Newsletters/Competition-Antitrust/European-Union/Baker-McKenzie-LLP/EU-merger-decision-shines-light-on-state-owned-enterprises.
29 | See Ministry of Commerce release, available at http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ae/ag/201801/20180102699398.shtml.
30 | See State Administration of Foreign Exchange release, available at http://www.safe.gov.cn.
31 | See the Guiding Opinions on Further Direct and Regulate Outbound Investment Direction, available at: http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2017-08/18/content_5218665.htm.
32 | See http://finance.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0801/c1004-29441056.html.
33 | Examples for nations that have recently changed their investment screening frameworks or discussed changes include Australia, Japan, the United States, Germany, the Netherlands, France, Italy, Latvia, Hungary. Chinese investment has been the primary or only driver in some, but not all of these cases.
34 | Note that this trend is amplified partially by our method of logging transactions at the headquarters of target companies. We logged the entire value of the USD 14 billion acquisition of Logicor warehouse assets (which are spread across Europe) in the UK.
35 | See for example HNA’s 8.8% stake in Deutsche Bank, or more recently Geely’s purchase of a 9.8% stake in Daimler. The Cheung Kong takeover of energy metering firm Ista (EUR 4,5 billion) should for statistical and analytical reasons not be counted as mainland Chinese.
36 | Geely’s stake in Volvo Group only amounts to 8.2% of outstanding shares but it comes with 15.6% of voting shares.
37 | http://rhg.com/notes/a-post-engagement-us-china-relationship