Europe’s research dilemma – balancing security and scientific cooperation with China

Beijing’s ambition to harness civilian technology for military uses is raising difficult questions for increasing numbers of researchers in Europe, say Altynay Junusova and Antonia Hmaidi. 

China’s ambitious drive to use civilian technological breakthroughs for military purposes has led to challenges for European research organizations cooperating with China, especially in so-called dual-use fields. Driven by its policy of “military-civil fusion”, China is increasingly allocating research funding according to strategic priorities, including military objectives. As China takes on a more active role internationally and continues to advance technologically, Europe will need to answer some hard questions. Are joint breakthroughs in climate-change science, for example, acceptable if they also improve China’s military capabilities? 

Europe has become more aware of risks, but still lacks a comprehensive strategy

Awareness in Europe about threats to research security has grown recently, but progress towards a comprehensive strategy remains slow. The European Commission in February 2026 excluded Chinese research organizations from direct funding under Horizon Europe. Even so, the world’s largest multinational research-funding program – with some 94 billion EUR to spend over the seven years between 2021 and 2027 – is considerably smaller than national budget allocations for research and development for only one year, which hit EUR 128 billion across the EU in 2024.  

That same year, member states backed EU recommendations to strengthen risk management, screening and cooperation between universities and national authorities, but most have failed to turn them into legally binding national measures. The Dutch government founded a national “Contact Point for Knowledge Security”, but Germany and other countries have done little, reflecting differing threat perceptions, economic and scientific interests and commitments to university autonomy. As a result, Europe has yet to find a consistently workable trade-off between scientific freedom and national security.

Dual use: Earth observation satellites as a case in point

One dual-use technology that illustrates this dilemma is earth observation (EO) satellites, which collect data about the planet by remote sensing. The very first human-made satellite, Sputnik 1, was an EO satellite, sending radio signals that were used to study the upper atmosphere. Today, its successors are key to climate change research, allowing researchers to detect emission hotspots for targeted mitigation, monitor difficult-to-access terrain like permafrost and wetland areas, and analyze global trends on the basis of comparable data. 

But EO satellites are also militarily useful. For instance, hyperspectral and high-resolution images from China’s EO programs – such as the Gaofen optical radar satellites, Yunhai meteorological satellites, and Tianhui mapping satellites – support civilian applications like crop-yield assessments and ecological monitoring. But these same satellites can also monitor the state of infrastructure, the movement of people, vehicles and ships, and changes in critical supply chains, making them militarily useful. For example, earth observation satellites are used by both sides in the Russia-Ukraine war to help conduct precision strikes. 

The dual-use nature of EO satellites allows China to leverage civilian technological advances for military and geopolitical advantage.  By integrating military or national-security objectives into civilian infrastructure, Beijing can build its hard power under the cover of economic development or international cooperation. There is clear evidence that the People’s Liberation Army is using data from China’s civilian EO infrastructure. Beijing bills its optical remote sensing Yaogan satellites as civilian, but they are also used for military reconnaissance – Chinese companies reportedly sold images of Ukraine and Africa to Russia.

Europe’s traditional academic openness could undermine strategic interests

At the same time, China, the world’s largest CO2-emitter, is becoming an increasingly important climate-change research partner for Europe. With the US, traditionally Europe’s largest scientific partner, stepping back from research in this area, China’s importance is growing. Building on long-standing EO collaboration, the EU in 2025 launched the BioClima project, proudly describing it as “enhanced by EU-China collaboration.” The initiative falls under one of two EU-China “flagship initiatives” that address global challenges – like climate change and biodiversity – and allows Chinese participation funded by the Chinese state. 

But even this type of research co-operation is under increasing scrutiny in Europe. When it comes to EO, China’s space sector is becoming more opaque, making it more difficult for European researchers to gauge the dual-use objectives of potential collaborators. Moreover, more and more Chinese research institutions are concealing their military affiliations. Beyond EO, civilian research into emerging technologies such as LiDAR, quantum sensing, and remote sensing can also bolster Chinese military capabilities. Europe’s traditional openness to academic collaboration increasingly risks undermining its strategic interests.

Europe needs to scrutinize possible cooperation on a per-project basis

As a result, research cooperation will from now on require more selective engagement and more careful project-level scrutiny, akin to EU economic security tools such as investment screening. European due diligence on potential Chinese partners should evaluate projects not only for scientific merit, but also for strategic sensitivity. As the current debate over research security shows, this is a big challenge for a continent that takes pride in academic freedom. But trade-offs between scientific freedom and European security must be found. 

Because most Chinese research organizations today have ties to China’s military or state security apparatus, due diligence systems based only on analyzing the potential partner institutions cannot distinguish between low-risk and high-risk collaborations. That’s why Project-level scrutiny of both technology and institutions will be necessary. This will not be cheap and an unwelcome burden in a time of strained university budgets across Europe. But with China’s military-civil fusion here to stay, new levels of oversight are the only means to ensure that European research does not undermine European security.

This article is part of a project by MERICS and the Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University (ISPK) on “How China uses civilian technology for its military modernization: Implications for Europe” funded by the German Ministry of Research, Technology and Space (BMFTR) in the funding line “Modern China Studies II”.