Country Profile: France

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President’s Macron last visit to China in April 2023 illustrates the French strategic ambiguity vis-a-vis China. While arguing that it aimed at pushing Beijing on political issues and global challenges, notably pressuring Russia in the context of the war in Ukraine and ensuring China’s delivery on climate change commitments, the size of the business delegation and the number of deals signed left no doubt that national economic interests played a crucial role. France balances economy and politics in an agile and sometimes ambiguous manner, allowing the country to successfully promote its priorities and deal with irritants.  

The level of engagement between Paris and Beijing has steadily increased after Covid, but this does not necessarily translate into concrete results and increased cooperation. It is yet to be seen whether the recent French diplomatic efforts will bring the Chinese tourists back to France. The French population has an increasingly negative view of China. In addition, the level of knowledge on China is relatively high, but still too low to face the China challenge over the long-term. The French government is committed to address this issue.

France has long seen its approach to China as part of its regional ambition in the Indo-Pacific region. Hence its security footprint in the region is growing. Given the French ambiguity on Taiwan, this issue may grow as an irritant between Paris and Beijing in the future.

Economy

France’s growing trade deficit with China reached EUR 39.6 billion in 2022, while French exports to China fell 1.3 percent. Except for the aeronautics sector, French industrial exports to China have dropped off so exports now focus on high-end retail products. France has more investments in China measured by the number of companies – 2,085 companies in 2020 - than any other European country. French financial institutions are strong in the burgeoning arena of financial services which is opening up to foreign firms, (i.e., insurance, asset management or consumer credit). Chinese tourists provide France’s leisure sector with a significant revenue stream. 

Chinese investments in France focus on entertainment, energy, and transport. Two strategic sectors - telecoms and automotive – have attracted limited but fast-growing greenfield investment. Huawei will build its first European factory in France, even though its 5G equipment licenses will not be renewed there. Instead, the plant will make 5G equipment for export within Europe, notably to Germany. Envision AESC will build an electric vehicle battery plant in Douai for Renault, with European Investment Bank support. France wants to attract more Chinese investments to its “Battery Valley”.  

Politics

France’s Indo Pacific Strategy released in 2022 seeks to address China’s increasing assertiveness. President Emmanuel Macron, on his July 2023 visit to the French Pacific territory of New Caledonia, criticizing the “new imperialism”, clarified that China plays an important role in France’s regional calculus. France uses the EU’s multifaceted approach to China as a toolkit and tries to Europeanize its bilateral interactions when useful. 

Sino-French official engagement returned to pre-pandemic levels in 2022, with 5 visits and 10 calls (in 2019 there were 10 visits and 6 calls). The visits produced lengthy joint communiques, but not necessarily more cooperation. The two have not signed any new formal agreements since 2019. France’s focus remains on solving trade and economic irritants and pressing China to deliver on its international commitments and responsibilities, notably on climate and debt relief.

Taiwan has risen as a topic in French political debate. President Macron warned against Europe following US positions on Taiwan in April 2023. The French political elite is divided. Jean-Luc Melenchon, leader of leftwing France Insoumise, supported by the Communist Party, declared that there is only “One China”. The Greens and the Socialists have distanced themselves from this statement. The right-wing Les Republicains support Taiwan to counter China’s hegemony. The position of far-right presidential contender Marine Le Pen is unknown, while her foreign policy advisor has claimed “Taiwan is China”.

Security

Certain Chinese behaviors have become a national security issue for France as it reflects on its vulnerabilities and tries to address it. For instance, a 2019 law known as “the 5G law” aims to protect French networks from Huawei’s equipment. The French Parliament has scrutinized investments in critical infrastructure (including 5G), repeated cyber-attacks (three were attributed to China since 2019) and influence operations. 

However, France perceives opportunities to cooperate on security and defense issues, as shown by the regular consultations between France and China defense. In addition, the 2007 extradition treaty between France and China is still active and France also remains a provider of military helicopters and dual use equipment to China. 

Society

France appears to be losing its appeal in China, judging by fewer Chinese students studying there and tourist visits. The number of Chinese students who chose France fell by 6.1 percent between 2019 and 2022. The level of academic expertise on China remains insufficient in France: With only 18 sinology departments, more than in other Member States, France does not have sufficient capacity in sinology. 

France was the most popular tourist destination in 2019: almost 2 billion visitors contributed EUR 3.5 billion to the economy. However, the number of Chinese tourists in 2022 was only 242 449, almost 8 times less than pre-pandemic, a loss for the French economy. 2023 will be the year to assess whether Chinese tourists are willing to come back to France after the pandemic. 

France views on China are not positive: In 2022, 68% of the people interrogated declared having an unfavorable view of China.

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This MERICS analysis is part of the project “Dealing with a Resurgent China” (DWARC) which has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon Europe research and innovation programme under grant agreement number 101061700.

Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.