China-Russia Dashboard: Facts and figures on a special relationship

China-Russia bilateral trade has grown steadily over the last decade and has intensified since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In 2024, total trade reached USD 245 billion, more than double that of 2020. The trade balance has been relatively even in value terms, with only a slight Russian surplus. However, it is structurally imbalanced in the types of goods traded. Russia’s exports to China mainly consist of fossil fuels and other natural resources, while China’s exports consist of manufactured goods such as cars, tractors, electronics, and other consumer products. The value of Russian exports is thus sensitive to volatile energy markets, and a large part of its increase in recent years is due to higher energy prices. Since the initial surge in 2022 and 2023, bilateral trade stabilized in 2024, with a slight decline observed so far in 2025.

Russia’s energy exports to China form the backbone of their bilateral trade, steadily increasing in both value and volume. After 2022, China’s market acted as a safety net, allowing Russia to redirect fossil fuel exports from the West. However, the substantial decline in their value since 2024 – especially in the case of oil flow – shows how highly dependent this trade is on global energy prices, highlighting the constraints on further expansion.

Russian oil exports to China surged from 2022 onwards, reaching more than 108 million tonnes in 2024 – an increase of about 30 percent since 2022. The growing share of Russian oil in China’s imports is largely a consequence of Western sanctions, which forced Russia to redirect its crude exports – even at a certain discount. While China has become a key buyer, the value of this trade remains highly sensitive to price fluctuations: despite only a modest decline in volume in 2025, its value has fallen sharply.

Russia’s coal exports to China have grown steadily, with a notable acceleration in 2023 due to Western sanctions. As Russian exporters lost access to EU markets, they intensified shipments to China. However, after reaching a record high in 2023, volumes started to decline, suggesting certain limitations on further growth due to the rise in domestic output in China and diversification of coal imports.

Russian LNG exports to China have grown steadily, with a temporary dip in 2021 due to pandemic-related constraints. Chinese LNG imports from Russia more than tripled between 2019 and 2024, reaching a record 8.3 million tonnes. This increase aligns with China’s efforts to replace coal with gas in its energy mix. 

Russia began exporting pipeline gas to China in 2019 with the launch of the Power of Siberia-1, which is set to reach its full capacity of 38 billion cubic meters per year by 2025. China has become a crucial market for Russian gas, helping to offset losses from Europe. However, despite rising exports, Russia needs additional pipelines to expand its market share further. So far, China has been hesitant to approve new projects while Moscow tries to push the project of the Power of Siberia-2 with its 50 bcm/y design capacity. 

Since 2003, Russia and China have conducted over 93 joint military exercises across various domains and formats. These include ground, naval, aerial, para-military and multi-domain exercises, as well as army competitions and computer simulations. The number of exercises per year has increased in recent years, reaching an all-time high of 11 in 2024, although decreasing in 2025.

However, since 2022, most joint exercises – 19 of 30 – have consisted of naval drills and patrols, accounting for all the recent growth in joint exercise activity. Starting from their joint naval exercise in 2009, Russia and China conducted only a few such exercises annually. However, in 2024 alone, 7 out of 11 total exercises were naval, and in 2025, they have only conducted naval drills and patrols.

The only other exercise type that also has increased are aerial patrols. Since their first in 2019, a total of nine such patrols have been held. All other types have decreased or even ceased entirely. Only two ground exercises have taken place since 2017. The last paramilitary exercise was in 2019, the last competition in 2022, and the last joint computer simulation exercise was in 2017.

Joint Russia-China military exercises have grown significantly in number, size, complexity and geographic scope since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Since their first in 2003, the two countries have conducted a total of 93 joint exercises – 28 of them, or nearly a third, since February 24, 2022. 

In 2024 alone, they held 11 joint exercises across ground, naval and aerial domains, including their first joint naval patrol in the Arctic Ocean, the first joint coast guard patrol, and the first joint aerial patrol that entered the US air defence identification zone. In September 2024, China participated in Ocean-2024, Russia’s largest naval exercise since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In August 2025, they held their first joint submarine patrol.

However, exercises have decreased in 2025: up until November, only four have been held – all of them naval. This potentially reflects war-related Russian diminished capacities and growing Chinese caution.
 

Shipments of dual-use items from China to Russia surged in late 2021, likely driven by stockpiling and year-end production peaks. Exports then fell sharply after the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine amid concerns about sanctions, yet quickly recovered, remaining historically high throughout 2022 and 2023. A renewed decline occurred following the US Treasury’s announcement in December 2023 of potential secondary sanctions on entities assisting Russia’s military-industrial base. However, Chinese exports rebounded in the second half of 2024, suggesting adjustments to circumvent these restrictions. As a result, dual-use shipments from China to Russia once again exceeded USD 4 billion in 2024. At the beginning of 2025, they declined again — mirroring the overall trend in China-Russia trade — but rebounded in the following months.

Note: The data refers to dual-use goods included in the Common High Priority List, developed jointly by the United States, the European Union, Japan, and the United Kingdom. The list categorizes 50 items, each identified by a six-digit Harmonized System (HS) code, into four tiers. The full list is available on the website of the US Bureau of Industry and Security. The values represent a 3-month moving average and have been adjusted to reflect the HS 2022 Nomenclature amendments.

Key figures in China-Russia bilateral relations indicate a closer alignment across various domains, highlighting stronger strategic coordination in political narratives and military cooperation. Both Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin have set the tone for these relations, not only based on their respective geopolitical positions but also by promoting a shared worldview and ambition to build an alternative global order – one in which China and Russia play a greater role as stabilizing powers. This ambition is further articulated by their chief diplomats, Wang Yi and Sergey Lavrov, who emphasize the goal of establishing a multipolar world order and the democratization of international relations. Military leaders from both sides have also called for deeper cooperation, aiming to enhance stability not only between China and Russia but also within the broader global system.

Sources: 

Quotes from Chinese representatives: CNN, SCMP, Chinese Ministry of Defense, SCMP
Quotes from Russian representatives: CNBC, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Reuters, Global Times

This timeline tracks China-Russia bilateral engagements in three key domains – heads of state, diplomatic, and military – since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The frequency of these interactions surpasses that of any other bilateral relationship for both China and Russia. Between February 2022 and June 2025, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin interacted 11 times through in-person meetings or phone calls. Top diplomats Wang Yi and Sergey Lavrov met 20 times, including bilateral visits and discussions on the sidelines of multilateral summits. Military leaders from both sides – such as Sergei Shoigu, Andrei Belousov, Zhang Youxia, Dong Jun, Li Shangfu, and Wei Fenghe – held 9 engagements during this period. Other than the frequency of engagements, the trend in key messaging shows growing alignment on strategic coordination in multilateral platforms and a stronger tone in opposing unilateral actions such as sanctions and military interventions by the United States.

The graph illustrates a decline in voting alignment between China and Russia in both the General Assembly and the Security Council from 2018 to 2024. Voting coordination remains stronger in the Security Council, where the two countries did not vote in direct opposition during the measured period. When their votes differ in the Security Council, it is due to one voting in favor or against while the other abstains.

The operation of border checkpoints serves as a barometer of China-Russia bilateral relations. Traditionally, the Chinese side has been more proactive in promoting trade through these checkpoints, while the Russian side has shown more caution, primarily due to concerns over China’s growing role in the development of the Russian Far East. As a result, infrastructure improvements on the Russian side have progressed slowly. However, since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the end of China’s COVID lockdowns, these checkpoints have become significantly busier, with trade volumes reaching record highs. There has also been notable progress in expanding capacity to facilitate bilateral trade – for instance, the construction of bridges across the Amur River and the expansion of checkpoint facilities. The increasing activity at these checkpoints reflects a broader trend of China-Russia alignment and highlights Russia’s growing dependency on China, suggesting Moscow is now prioritizing its relationship with Beijing, while becoming less concerned about China’s influence in the development of the Russian Far East.

The number of Chinese exchange students in Russia has grown steadily over the years, increasing from approximately 30,000 in 2020 to over 50,000 in 2024, a 72% increase. Similarly, Chinese students have accounted for a growing share of all foreign exchange students in Russia, rising from 9.4% in 2020 to 13.6% in 2024. As a result, China has surpassed other countries and is now the third-largest country of origin – its student numbers nearly matching those of the top two, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. While Chinese students at the bachelor’s level make up the largest group in absolute numbers, China is by far the leading country of origin for master’s students. In 2024, its 16,411 master’s students represented approximately 36% of all master’s students in Russia.

The number of tourist visits between Russia and China grew steadily for years, peaking in 2019 with nearly 1.9 million Russian visits to China and over 2.3 million Chinese visits to Russia. However, tourism between the two countries collapsed during the COVID-19 pandemic and further declined following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, with visits dwindling to just a few thousand in 2021 and 2022.

In 2023, tourism rebounded significantly in both directions, though it remained far below pre-pandemic levels – less than a third of the peak recorded in 2019. As a share of total tourist visits to Russia, Chinese tourist visits peaked at 7.7% in 2019, plummeted to 0.3% in 2021 and 2022, and recovered to 5.8% in 2023.