China-Russia Dashboard: Facts and figures on a special relationship

China-Russia bilateral trade has grown steadily over the last decade and has intensified since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Following a sharp surge in 2022 and 2023, China–Russia trade stabilized in 2024 at USD 245 billion, more than double the 2020 level. In 2025, bilateral trade fell by 6.9 percent year-on-year. In 2026 so far, trade has rebounded strongly in both directions. July 2026 recorded the highest monthly trade value to date, partly reflecting higher oil prices and increased Chinese exports to Russia, led by vehicles.

The trade balance has been relatively even in value, generally with a slight Russian surplus. However, it is structurally imbalanced in the types of goods traded. Russia’s exports to China consist mainly of fossil fuels and other natural resources, while China’s exports are manufactured goods such as cars, tractors, electronics, and other consumer products. The value of Russian exports is thus particularly sensitive to volatile energy markets.

Note: Nominal values

Last updated: August 31, 2026

China’s imports from Russia mainly consist of natural resources. Since February 2022, on average, 70 percent of the total trade value has been composed of mineral fuels (primarily crude oil). Base metals accounted for a further eight percent, animal and vegetable products and foodstuffs six percent, other mineral products five percent, and wood and paper four percent. Due to falling global oil prices and higher sanction-driven discounts on Russian oil, the value of mineral fuel imports declined in 2025, while the shares of other categories grew correspondingly. Following the disruption of Middle Eastern oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz, the value of mineral fuel imports surged again in the first half of 2026.

China’s exports to Russia are more diversified and consist primarily of manufactured goods. Since February 2022, on average, machinery and mechanical appliances have made up around 23 percent of the total trade value. Vehicles, mainly passenger cars, accounted for 17 percent, electrical machinery and equipment 15 percent, and textiles, footwear, and headgear approximately 10 percent. The rebound in 2026 has been driven partly by a surge in vehicle exports, which recovered after almost halving in 2025 amid market saturation and increases in Russia’s vehicle recycling fee. A second driver is a sharp increase in goods recorded under simplified customs procedures (HS 98), including border trade and cross-border e-commerce parcels. These are included in “Misc. manufactures, Other,” which reached around 12 percent of Chinese exports to Russia in June and July.

Note: Nominal values

Last updated: August 31, 2026
 

Russia’s energy exports to China form the backbone of their bilateral trade, steadily increasing in both value and volume. After 2022, China’s market acted as a safety net, allowing Russia to redirect fossil fuel exports from the West. However, the volatile nature of the exchange – especially in the case of oil, declining since 2024 and then shooting up in 2026 – shows how highly dependent this trade is on global energy prices.

Last updated: August 6, 2026

Since 2003, Russia and China have conducted 100 joint military exercises across various domains and formats. These include ground, naval, aerial, para-military and multi-domain exercises, as well as army competitions and computer simulations. The number of exercises per year has increased in recent years, reaching an all-time high of 11 in 2024, although decreasing in 2025.

Since 2022, a large majority of joint exercises – 22 of 37 – have consisted of naval drills and patrols, accounting for the recent growth in joint exercise activity. Between their first joint naval exercise in 2009 and 2022, Russia and China conducted only a few such exercises annually. However, in 2024 alone, 7 out of 11 total exercises were naval, and in 2025, 4 of 7 were naval drills and patrols. In spring 2026, the US/Israel-Iran war caused issues for the annual trilateral naval exercise involving China, Russia and Iran.

Last updated: September 8, 2026
 

Joint Russia-China military exercises have grown significantly in number, size, complexity and geographic scope since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Since their first in 2003, the two countries have conducted a total of 100 joint exercises – 37 of them since February 24, 2022. In 2024, the number of their joint exercises peaked with 11 drills across ground, naval and aerial domains, including their first joint naval patrol in the Arctic Ocean, the first joint coast guard patrol, and the first joint aerial patrol that entered the US air defence identification zone.

In 2025, the number of joint drills was lower – seven in total – but contained some new elements. For example, in August 2025, Russia and China held their first joint submarine patrol. In multilateral formats December 2025 saw the first-ever multilateral Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) exercise in Iran. At the same time, joint exercises are becoming more routine, with some exercises now taking place annually.

In spring 2026, the US/Israel-Iran war caused issues for the annual trilateral naval exercise involving China, Russia and Iran, with lack of clear information on Chinese participation.

Last updated: September 8, 2026

Shipments of dual-use items from China to Russia surged in late 2021, likely driven by stockpiling and year-end production peaks. Exports then fell sharply after the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine amid concerns about sanctions, yet quickly recovered, remaining historically high throughout 2022 and 2023. A renewed decline occurred following the US Treasury’s announcement in December 2023 of potential secondary sanctions on entities assisting Russia’s military-industrial base. However, Chinese exports rebounded in the second half of 2024, suggesting adjustments to circumvent these restrictions. As a result, dual-use shipments from China to Russia once again exceeded USD 4 billion in 2024. At the beginning of 2025, they declined again — mirroring the overall trend in China-Russia trade — but rebounded in the following months, and over the full year rose back above USD 4 billion.

Note: The data refers to dual-use goods included in the Common High Priority List, developed jointly by the United States, the European Union, Japan, and the United Kingdom. The list categorizes 50 items, each identified by a six-digit Harmonized System (HS) code, into four tiers. The full list is available on the website of the US Bureau of Industry and Security. The values represent a 3-month moving average and have been adjusted to reflect the HS 2022 Nomenclature amendments.

Last updated: September 2, 2026

Beijing and Moscow reacted in close rhetorical alignment to the US-Israeli strikes on Iran and the killing of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, jointly condemning the attacks as violations of sovereignty, international law and diplomacy. Statements from senior leaders, foreign ministries and UN representatives in both countries stressed that Iran was in the midst of negotiations with the United States, portraying the strikes as a “betrayal of diplomacy” that deliberately undercut ongoing talks and sharply escalated regional tensions. Both sides called for an immediate ceasefire and a return to political dialogue, framing the crisis as a test case for defending the norms of state sovereignty.

Notably, in the Chinese readout of the Lavrov-Wang Yi call of March 1, Sergey Lavrov is quoted as stressing Russia’s readiness to step up coordination with China, including through the United Nations and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization – a forward-leaning coordination signal that is not mirrored by Wang Yi in the Chinese account. The Russian readout, by contrast, presents the exchange more symmetrically, emphasizing shared positions rather than Russian initiative. As of March 3, Chinese leader Xi Jinping has not officially reacted to the most recent escalations.

Sources:

Quotes from Chinese representatives: PRC MFA; Permanent Mission of the PRC to the UN; X

Quotes from Russian representatives: Moscow Times; RUS MFA; Permanent Mission of RUS to the UN; RUS MFA

Last updated: March 3, 2026

Key figures in China-Russia bilateral relations indicate a closer alignment across various domains, highlighting stronger strategic coordination in political narratives and military cooperation. Both Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin have set the tone for these relations, not only based on their respective geopolitical positions but also by promoting a shared worldview and ambition to build an alternative global order – one in which China and Russia play a greater role as stabilizing powers. This ambition is further articulated by their chief diplomats, Wang Yi and Sergey Lavrov, who emphasize the goal of establishing a multipolar world order and the democratization of international relations. Military leaders from both sides have also called for deeper cooperation, aiming to enhance stability not only between China and Russia but also within the broader global system.

Sources:

Quotes from Chinese representatives: PRC MFA, PRC MFA, Guancha
Quotes from Russian representatives: Kremlin, RUS MFA, PRC Ministry of National Defense

Last updated: February 1, 2026

This timeline tracks China-Russia bilateral engagements in three key domains – heads of state, diplomatic, and military – since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine  on February 24, 2022. The frequency of these interactions surpasses that of any other bilateral relationship for both China and Russia. Between February 2022 and April 2026, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin interacted 19 times through in-person meetings or phone calls. Top diplomats Wang Yi and Sergey Lavrov spoke 33 times, including in bilateral discussions and multilateral settings. Military leaders from both sides – such as Sergei Shoigu, Andrey Belousov, Dong Jun, Li Shangfu, and Wei Fenghe – held 14 engagements during this period. Other than the frequency of engagements, the trend in key messaging shows growing alignment on strategic coordination in multilateral platforms and a stronger tone in opposing unilateral actions such as sanctions and military interventions by the United States.

For more details and key outcomes of these meetings, click here.

Last updated: September 10, 2026

The operation of border checkpoints serves as a barometer of China-Russia bilateral relations. Traditionally, the Chinese side has been more proactive in promoting trade through these checkpoints, while the Russian side has shown more caution, primarily due to concerns over China’s growing role in the development of the Russian Far East. As a result, infrastructure improvements on the Russian side have progressed slowly. However, since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the end of China’s COVID lockdowns, these checkpoints have become significantly busier, with trade volumes reaching record highs. There has also been notable progress in expanding capacity to facilitate bilateral trade – for instance, the construction of bridges across the Amur River and the expansion of checkpoint facilities. The increasing activity at these checkpoints reflects a broader trend of China-Russia alignment and highlights Russia’s growing dependency on China, suggesting Moscow is now prioritizing its relationship with Beijing, while becoming less concerned about China’s influence in the development of the Russian Far East.

Student exchanges between China and Russia have grown substantially since 2022/23 but remain highly asymmetric. Chinese student enrollment at Russian universities has increased much faster than Russian enrollment in China. Chinese student numbers in Russia have doubled compared to the pre-Covid period but the number of Russian students in China has only returned to pre-Covid levels. This is likely due to several factors, including Russia’s targeted recruitment of Chinese students and relatively affordable study options.

Both governments are actively promoting closer educational ties. China and Russia are expanding university partnerships, joint programs and student exchanges, while language education is growing in both directions. Chinese-language instruction has expanded across Russian schools and universities, while Russian is taught at an increasing number of Chinese universities. The 2026–2027 China–Russia Years of Education, are intended to further deepen these links. The expansion of Chinese-language education in Russia could, over time, create a larger pool of Russian students studying in China.

The figures should be read primarily as an indication of the trend. Definitions and reporting periods vary between sources; “students” primarily refers to degree-seeking university students and generally excludes non-degree and pre-university language-course students.

Sources:

2022/2023: Russian government website

2023/2024: China Daily

2024/2025: TASS

2025/2026: China Diplomacy.org

Last updated: September 8, 2026

The number of Chinese exchange students in Russia has grown steadily over the years, increasing from approximately 30,000 in 2020 to over 50,000 in 2024, a 72% increase. Similarly, Chinese students have accounted for a growing share of all foreign exchange students in Russia, rising from 9.4% in 2020 to 13.6% in 2024. As a result, China has surpassed other countries and is now the third-largest country of origin – its student numbers nearly matching those of the top two, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. While Chinese students at the bachelor’s level make up the largest group in absolute numbers, China is by far the leading country of origin for master’s students. In 2024, its 16,411 master’s students represented approximately 36% of all master’s students in Russia.