MERICS China Economic Indicators

MERICS China Economic Indicators

MERICS China Economic Indicators is our quarterly analysis of China’s economic data. The MERICS Economy and Industry team provides updates on the latest macroeconomic trends and their impact on Europe. The findings are presented on a dashboard in interactive charts and explained in concise texts. In-depth analyses put a spotlight on the most important developments. 

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MCCI slumps, as households save more
MCCI slumps, as households save more

  • Sentiment crumbles: After improvements at the start of the year, two consecutive quarters of decline in the MCCI point to fragile sentiment.
  • Savings trump consumption: The MCCI’s decline was mainly driven by a deteriorating expenditure share of income, suggesting households favor savings over consumption in the face of China’s ongoing real estate crisis. This is also reflected in low demand in the domestic economy.
Steady expansion in manufacturing and most service sectors supports robust growth
Steady expansion in manufacturing and most service sectors supports robust growth

  • Growth is on target: In Q3 2026, China’s GDP grew by 4.5 percent, thanks to strong performances in the service and manufacturing sectors. With growth of 4.6 percent for the January-September period, China is on track to hit its full-year growth target of 4.5-5.0 percent.
  • Construction slows down: Less building activity in the real estate sector continues to pose a drag on growth. The government has also limited new infrastructure investments as it focuses more on tackling financial risks. The result has been a long decline in construction. GDP growth in the sector has been negative and getting worse for six straight quarters, reaching negative 4.4 percent in Q3.
  • Economic resilience may still be tested: China has managed to maintain moderate growth momentum this year, despite growing imbalances between different parts of the economy. Rising exports due to the AI boom have made weak domestic consumption and falling investment more tolerable, at least for now. Should this cycle end and global demand fall, the pressure on China’s leadership to address these weaknesses will grow.
High-tech firms ramp up production but building materials sector contracts
High-tech firms ramp up production but building materials sector contracts

  • Push for high-tech products is paying off: Growth in industrial value-added output for the manufacturing sector remained strong over Q3, finishing up 6.0 percent year-on-year in September. High-tech manufacturing grew by 15.3 percent, compensating for lackluster growth in the mining sector.
  • Foreign demand drives increased output: Strong global demand for AI and green tech products is driving the rising production value of China’s high-tech goods. In Q3, China’s exports of integrated circuits in USD terms grew by 128 percent, while exports of new energy vehicles (primarily electric and hybrid vehicles) in unit terms rocketed up 146 percent.
  • Construction is still shrinking: The years-long trend of rising output for high-tech goods and falling output for construction related products continues. In September, output in unit terms of industrial robots rose 18.9 percent, integrated circuits were up 18.4 percent and new energy vehicles grew by 16.9. By contrast, output of plated glass, cement and pig iron fell by 14.0 percent, 5.3 percent and 1.4 percent respectively.
Investment slowdown gets more pronounced
Investment slowdown gets more pronounced

  • Investment is losing momentum: After a brief rebound at the start of the year, growth in fixed asset investment saw deeper declines every month from April to August, before stabilizing at negative 7.2 percent year-on-year in September. 
  • Manufacturing is no longer shielded: Every major category of investment is now contracting. Manufacturing investment was still growing in 2025 but now it is down 2.1 percent as it has become limited to strategic industries. Investment in railway, shipbuilding and aerospace equipment manufacturing, for example, increased by 15.8 percent year-on-year, while electronics manufacturing investment rose by 9.6 percent.
  • The property downturn shows no sign of ending: Real estate investment fell 20.6 percent, the steepest contraction on record, a reminder of how entrenched the crisis is. Beyond its direct impact on investment, the prolonged property crisis is impacting land-sale revenues, giving already heavily-indebted local governments less room to support companies’ growth.
Rebound in PPI driven by energy intense sectors
Rebound in PPI driven by energy intense sectors

  • Increase in producer prices is driven by energy costs: After more than three years of deflation, China’s Producer Price Index (PPI) extended the rebound that began in Q2. The recovery was driven mainly by energy intense sectors, rather than any increase in companies’ pricing power. Mining and quarrying prices jumped 25.4 percent, with oil and gas extraction up 24.5 percent and coal mining up 35 percent. Apart from disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz, China also faced declining coal shipments from Indonesia and a 10 percent fall in domestic coal output in June and July after a deadly mine collapse in Shanxi Province in May led to some temporary mine closures and widespread additional safety checks. 
  • Prices keep falling in sectors that compete with European industry: Deflationary trends persist in downstream sectors. While manufacturing prices rose 3.4 percent overall, general machinery prices fell by 0.4 percent and car prices by 2 percent. Weak domestic demand and intense competition continue to weigh on Chinese manufacturers and will encourage them to continue competing aggressively in export markets, putting pressure on European firms.
Trade surplus widens as export growth overtakes imports again
Trade surplus widens as export growth overtakes imports again

  • AI and tech-related prices explain trade surge: Rising prices for AI and high-tech goods continue to drive the value of China’s trade, with semiconductor imports up 74.7 percent and computer part imports up 296.5 percent, in USD terms in Q3. These categories also boosted exports, particularly semiconductors (up 136 percent) and electronics and computer parts, as well as green tech. 
  • Tech-trade volumes are down: By contrast, in terms of quantity, China’s trade in high-tech products was less strong. Semiconductor exports rose only 1.2 percent and imports 1.7 percent. Auto exports were an exception, higher in value and volume terms, with 1.18 million vehicles (including chassis) shipped in September.
  • No rebalancing in sight: The balance of trade between Europe and China is increasingly skewed in China’s favor, as trends are working against the EU in both imports and exports. China’s trade surplus with the EU reached USD 277.4 billion (EUR 241.1 billion) for the year to September, a 26.2 percent increase year-on-year. China’s trade surplus with the rest of the world grew by 7.8 percent over the same period.
Growth in China’s imports from the EU falls behind other countries and regions
Growth in China’s imports from the EU falls behind other countries and regions

  • Imports from the EU are stagnant: China’s Q3 import growth surged by 29 percent year-on-year in USD terms, buoyed by the AI cycle and rising prices for related goods. However, imports from the EU stagnated, due to its position outside of high-volume AI-supply chains. In Q3, the EU accounted for 8.2 percent of China’s total imports, ASEAN 15.4 percent and Latin America 9.1 percent.
  • EU sells China less autos, machinery and chemicals: Amid the overall slump in EU-derived imports in Q3, imports of organic chemicals dropped 27.4 percent year-on-year, vehicle imports plunged by 32.5 percent, meat and offal fell 32.9 percent and imports of electrical machinery grew a slower rate of 13.4 percent.
  • Other regions are benefiting from supply chain links: China’s imports from Latin America and Africa rose strongly, likely due to increasing prices of tech-related metals, minerals and ores. Imports from ASEAN similarly received a substantial boost thanks to increased imports of intermediate goods such as parts, components and production inputs. The surge for the United States is primarily due to base effects, given imports decreased starkly in Q3 2025 during the trade war.
The bull market on China's stock exchanges is over
The bull market on China's stock exchanges is over

  • Stock markets have peaked: After enjoying long, and largely steady, gains throughout 2025, China’s stock exchange indices seem to have peaked. As of September, the Shanghai, Shenzhen and Beijing stock exchanges were down 8 percent, 15 percent, and 34 percent, respectively, from their peaks.
  • The AI bubble is deflating: Cooling investor enthusiasm towards tech companies has played a big role in the downturn. The STAR Market, a segment of the Shanghai Stock Exchange which tracks major technology companies, has dropped almost 40 percent so far in the second half of this year. Companies suffering significant declines in their valuations include GPU designer Moore Threads, semiconductor producer CXMT, and robotics firm Yushu Technology. 
  • Another blow to confidence: With real estate prices still falling and interest rates on deposits at Chinese banks traditionally repressed, the stock market declines threaten to erode the one remaining channel open to Chinese households to store and increase wealth. This is more bad news for consumer confidence and domestic demand.
Consumption still in the doldrums despite steady income
Consumption still in the doldrums despite steady income

  • Save don’t spend: Over the past year, a large gap has opened up between growth in per capita consumption expenditure, which rose 3.5 percent in Q3, and growth in per capita disposable income (i.e. the amount left after people pay their taxes and basic needs), which rose 5.4 percent. Households will continue to prefer saving to spending. 
  • Consumers are still pessimistic: The trend for more saving than spending signals consumer confidence remains depressed; it crashed in 2022 and has yet to recover. The Consumer Confidence Index was only 89.2 points in August. It was even lower for employment, at 74.4 points (a reading below 100 indicates consumers are more willing to save than spend, or more pessimistic than optimistic about employment prospects).
  • Government support for demand is underwhelming: The government has repeatedly signaled additional support for consumption and domestic demand, including a new Five-year Plan to expand consumption released in July. But actual measures focus on supply-side support and short-term subsidies instead of wage rises or the expansion of social services. So far, they have failed to meaningfully shore up retail sales, which in rose only 1.1 percent the first three quarters of 2026.
Domestic squeeze sends cars abroad
Domestic squeeze sends cars abroad

  • Sales are tumbling: Domestic passenger car sales dropped from 2.27 million units sold in September 2025 to only 1.62 million units sold in September 2026, plunging by 28.1 percent. The downturn was triggered by cuts in policy support since January; tax exemptions on NEVs were reduced and trade-in subsidies on old cars became less generous. Aggressive incentives offered in 2024 and 2025 brought forward demand and have contributed to the subsequent slump in 2026. 
  • Exports surge ahead: Passenger car exports are increasingly filling the gap left by slowing domestic sales. Exports reached 923,000 units in September 2026, jumping 73.2 percent year-on-year.
  • Europe feels the squeeze: Europe is a key export destination for Chinese passenger cars. From January to August, the EU imported around 1.1 million passenger cars from China. In September alone, China exported nearly 100,000 hybrid cars to the EU. As demand declines in China, and production does not, European car manufacturers will continue to face the fallout in their home market.
Industrial job numbers are declining, despite expansion in some sectors
 Industrial job numbers are declining, despite expansion in some sectors

  • In steady decline: Industrial jobs are still a major source of employment, but the number of opportunities in Chinese industry has been shrinking for over a decade.  According to official statistics, employment in China’s secondary sector peaked in 2012 at 232 million jobs. By 2025, this number had fallen to 206 million.
  • Upgraded factories need less labor: As China’s industrial output and exports have risen dramatically over the last decade, manufacturers have been able to upgrade production processes and move into higher value-added goods which require less low-skilled and more high-skilled labor. 
  • China’s rising wages still lag behind OECD countries: China’s push into more high-tech sectors is reflected in rising pay. Average annual wages in the manufacturing sector doubled between 2015 and 2025, reaching 100,572 RMB (12,388 EUR) in 2025. Yet high-skilled labor is still significantly cheaper in China than in other advanced economies. For comparison, average annual earnings in the manufacturing sector in Germany amounted to 67,520 EUR in 2025.
     
Estimates suggest over 40 percent of China's workforce is in flexible employment
Estimates suggest over 40 percent of China's workforce is in flexible employment

  • The gig economy is spreading: It is estimated that over 300 million workers in China will be in flexible employment in 2026, which means they work part-time, temporary or project-based jobs. These jobs traditionally include writers, translators, and taxi drivers. Recently, newly emerging professions such as content creators have also joined this category.
  • Flexibility risks instability: Flexible employment does not guarantee insurance coverage or participation in pension systems, creating potential instability. During low seasons, it might also be considered a form of unemployment.
  • AI impact: Some jobs, such as taxi drivers and translators, could potentially be replaced by AI. At the same time, new forms of flexible employment might be created. The trend towards flexible employment has been growing since 2015, and is likely to accelerate alongside the widespread adoption of AI in the years ahead.

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