Unusual speed and potential triggers: Assessing the latest purges in China’s military

The recent purges of the two high-ranking military leaders Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli came at a surprising time. Regular and rather brutal anti-corruption campaigns have been a constant feature in Xi Jinping’s China, say Daria Impiombato and Helena Legarda. The most unusual aspect of the latest purges, therefore, is not so much who was taken down, but rather the speed and timing.  

Xi’s move against Zhang and Liu, both members of the all-powerful Central Military Commission (CMC), so soon after the sweeping purges of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in October, and without an opportune moment like the upcoming plenum or next year’s Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress, points to a strong sense of urgency to clean house. Next year will be pivotal for China’s leadership, with the PLA’s 100th anniversary and the 21st Party Congress in late 2027– by which time Xi expects the military’s modernization and combat readiness goals to be complete. The US Department of War and other official sources have pointed to 2027 as the year by which Xi wants its military to be ready to fight (and win) a war over Taiwan.

But the road appears complex and not without plot twists. Xi is intent on eradicating what he sees as the root causes of unsatisfactory progress toward these milestones. The purge of Zhang and Liu in January was the climax of the latest anti-corruption campaign, leaving Xi and loyal military anti-corruption chief Zhang Shengmin alone to lead the party’s military forces, and stoking uncertainty and power vacuums in the command chains. While some observers said they were “shocked” at the fall of respected military veteran and princeling Zhang Youxia, especially after so many under him had been taken down, the move does have some precedent under Xi’s tenure and seems to have reached its pinnacle with the ousting of the PLA’s most senior general.  

Xi launched a sweeping anti-corruption campaign within the PLA shortly after taking office in 2013. During his first five years, two former vice-chairmen of the CMC, Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou, were purged for corruption. Two sitting CMC members – Joint Staff Department Chief Fang Fenghui and Political Work Department Director Zhang Yang – were placed under investigation shortly before the 19th Party Congress in 2017. And between 2023 and 2025, Xi took down four other CMC members, including former minister of defense Wei Fenghe, his successor Li Shangfu, CMC vice-chairman He Weidong, and Political Work Department Director Miao Hua.  

The reasons for the current purges are murky

The decision to take down Zhang and Liu now, regardless of the impact on China’s image at a time when Beijing is trying to project confidence, raises questions. Some have suggested Xi was dissatisfied with Zhang’s failure to deliver results on the 2027 and 2035 modernization goals. Zhang and Liu, two powerful figures themselves, may have been deemed politically dangerous for their opposition to Xi or their own personal networks, or possibly named in the probe against He Weidong and generals expelled in October. Or Xi simply wanted to make a clean sweep, frustrated by lingering corruption in the PLA more than a decade after his anti-corruption campaigns began.  

In any case, it is clear that the dismissals were largely of political nature. Since the purge, the PLA Daily has published several editorials on anti-corruption and the need to put the military “under the absolute leadership of the party.” They directly cite the ousting of Zhang and Liu as demonstrating the party’s resolve in “firmly defending the political nature of the people's army.” And they lambast the two generals for “gravely trampling upon and undermining the Chairman responsibility system of the CMC.” The urgency to provide such justification and strong backing of the decision offers insights into possible triggers and strengthens the theory of a (perceived or real) political threat to Xi.

Rumors about further purges abound

Xi’s two newest generals, Yang Zhibin and Han Shengyan, promoted in December to lead the Eastern and Central theater commands respectively, seem like obvious candidates to be elevated in one of the upcoming plenums. They are, after all, two of the PLA’s few remaining three-star generals. This, however, could entail another shuffling of the CMC.  

Of greater urgency to Xi might be the promotion of operational leaders to avoid irreparable repercussions in the armed forces. This new crop of generals would have to be loyal, committed to Xi’s agenda, and less corrupt. With repeated ferocious anti-corruption campaigns, many positions that would usually put generals on track for promotion are empty, or potential candidates are suspiciously absent from the public sphere, making predictions all the murkier.

Today, it is not just the CMC that is understaffed. Leadership positions in CMC functional departments like the Political Work or Joint Staff Departments, or in the PLA Navy and Rocket Force remain vacant. Several other generals who lead the PLA’s regional theater commands and services have also recently been absent from the public. While this does not mean they have been purged, rumors abound about them.

Xi will take some time to replace the purged generals

If Xi has proven anything over the last few years, it’s that he is not afraid of restructuring. But Xi will more likely take some time to replace purged generals and fill vacant positions before fully restaffing the CMC. He already had this opportunity at the latest plenum, but chose not to do so, signaling caution until the right people are identified.

The language used in official media to explain the demise of Zhang and Liu suggests this round of purges is not over. Further investigations and promotions to the rank of general might take place in the coming weeks and months while Xi prepares to unveil the new crop of officers who will (hopefully) be fully and truly loyal to him. And a new restructuring of the CMC at the next Party Congress is not out of the question.

In the short term, this is likely good news for Taiwan. With the CMC empty and chains of command disrupted, risky military action seems unlikely. In the long run, however, a new generation of PLA leaders deemed more loyal and trustworthy will likely increase the risk of conflict. It seems clear that, despite the current PLA disarray, Xi Jinping remains firmly in control of the levers of power and intent on seeing this clean-up campaign through, regardless of who must fall.

Sources:

• Thoughts on China: A Central Military Commission built for war - against the PLA
• BBC News (CN): 张又侠“七宗罪”和 “红二代”世交神话的破灭——分析